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Abstract
In identity-based (ID-based) cryptosystems, a local 
registration authority (LRA) is responsible for
authentication of users while the key generation
center (KGC) is responsible for computing and
sending the private keys to users and therefore, a 
secure channel is required. For privacy-oriented
applications, it is important to keep in secret whether 
the private key corresponding to a certain identity has 
been requested. All of the existing ID-based key 
issuing schemes have not addressed this anonymity 
issue. Besides, the separation of duties of LRA and 
KGC has not been discussed as well. We propose a 
novel separable and anonymous ID-based key issuing
scheme without secure channel. Our protocol supports 
the separation of duties between LRA and KGC. The 
private key computed by the KGC can be sent to the 
user in an encrypted form such that only the legitimate 
key requester authenticated by LRA can decrypt it, 
and any eavesdropper cannot know the identity
corresponding to the secret key.
1. Introduction
Traditional certificate-based public key
infrastructure (PKI) has succeeded in many
applications, but it is ill-suited for cross-enterprise
usage due to the administrative burden of certificates,
revocation lists, and cross-certification problems.
Besides, the requirement of PKI for pre-enrollment of all 
users limits its widespread adoption. On the other hand, 
ID-based cryptosystem eliminates the need for
certificates and overcomes those hurdles of PKI by 
allowing a public key to be derived from publicly known 
identifiers of the receiver, such as email addresses. A 
sender can send a secure message to a receiver even 
before the receiver obtains his/her private key from the 
key generation center (KGC). To read the encrypted 
messages, the receiver then obtains his private key 
from the KGC by authenticating himself in a similar way 
as in PKI systems. These ID-based systems are
scalable, simple to administer, and users can carry out 
anytime/anywhere encryption.
ID-based cryptosystem was introduced in 1984 by 
Shamir [1]; however, the first practical encryption
scheme (IBE) was not available until 2001 which was 
developed by Boneh and Franklin [2]. Boneh and 
Franklin’ s scheme (BF’ s scheme) is based on bilinear
mappings. Its security is based on a natural analogue of 
the comp utational Diffie -Hellman (CDH) assumption,
Bilinear Diffie -Hellman (BDH) assumption.
1.1. Motivations
One of the advantages of ID-based cryptosystems 
over certificate based PKI systems appear in the
signature schemes with anonymity concern. Let us 
investigate the case for ring signature. In ring signature, 
any user can anonymously sign a message on behalf of 
a group of spontaneously conscripted users. By
spontaneity we mean no previous setup is involved in 
the generation of this group of “signers” and we do not 
rely on any form of action performed before the
generation of signature by non-participating signers. 
For non ID-based schemes, real spontaneity is not 
always possible [3]: the public key of each member of 
the group is required to be published by the underlying 
PKI before it can be used to generate the signature, i.e. 
the rest of the group other than the actual signer have 
actively enrolled the PKI (which is an “action performed 
before the generation of signature”). With the help of 
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ID-based ring signature, this assumption is no longer 
necessary [3]. Every people, even those who do not 
know what PKI is, “have” their public key implicitly.
But we need to solve another problem before getting
the full solution: if an adversary can gain knowledge on 
which “identities” have requested the corresponding 
private keys, then the anonymity of these privacy-
oriented signature schemes is greatly affected. Hence, it 
is important to have an anonymous ID-based key 
issuing protocol.
Though ID-based cryptosystems have many
advantages over certificate based PKI systems in key 
distribution, they have an inherent drawback of
requiring a secure channel between users and the KGC 
for the private key delivery from the KGC to users.
In certificate based PKI system, the duties of
authentication and certificate generation are usually 
separated: certificate authority (CA) is responsible for 
the generation of certificate while local registration 
authorities (LRAs) are responsible for the subject 
authentication. The word local shows that these
registration authorities are usually geographically
distributed for the convenience of the subscribers. On 
the other hand, CA may be geographically far from the 
subscribers. In ID-based cryptosystems, similar to
certificate based PKI system, we need to authenticate 
the user before the generation of the private key 
corresponding to the purported identity.
1.2. Existing ID-based Key-issuing Protocol
There are a few key ID-based key issuing protocols, 
most of them aimed to tackle the key escrow problem. 
Some of them have tackled the secure channel issue but 
none of them addressed the anonymity issue and the 
separation of authentication and key-issuing.
In [2], the master key of the KGC is  distributed into 
multiple authorities, and the private key of a user is 
computed in a threshold manner, thus the key escrow 
problem of a single authority is prevented. Another 
proposal generates the private key of a user by adding 
multiple independent subkeys from multiple authorities 
[4]. The authorities work in a parallel mode. However, in 
the above two schemes, different authorities have to 
check and authenticate the user’ s identity
independently, which is quite a burden to the system. 
Lee et al . proposed a new scheme [5] in which a user’ s 
private key is issued by a KGC, and its privacy is 
protected by multiple key privacy authorities (KPAs). 
The authorities work in a sequential mode. Only one 
authority (the KGC) has to authenticate the user and 
thus it greatly reduces the cost of user identification.
The scheme also makes use of user-chosen secret 
information for constructing a secure channel for a user 
to retrieve his private key securely. However, it requires 
quite an amount of computation.
In this paper, we propose an anonymous and secure 
key issuing protocol without secure channel. Our
construction is inspired from a variation of blind
signature scheme. In the following, we first review some 
of the existing short signature schemes before
presenting our contributions.
1.3. Short Signatures based on GDH
While researchers are trying to improve the IBE
system, some new signature schemes based on the idea 
of IBE are proposed. In particular, Boneh et al. [6]
introduced a short signature scheme based on the co-
Gap Diffie-Hellman (co-GDH) assumption on certain 
elliptic and hyper-elliptic curves. The signature length 
is approximately 170 bits, which provides a level of 
security similar to that of 320-bit DSA signatures. Thus 
it helps to reduce the communication cost by half for 
transmitting the signature. This is essentially important 
for constrained channels. The scheme is secure against 
existential forgery under a chosen-message attack in 
the random oracle model. Generating a signature is a 
simple multiplication on the curve, which is very similar 
with the private key extraction in IBE scheme [2].
Verifying the signature is done using a bilinear pairing
on the curve. Based on the short signature scheme in 
[6], Boldyreva [7] developed a blind signature scheme. 
Our scheme makes use of these ideas as well [6, 7].
2. Building Block
2.1. Bilinear Pairings and Related Problems
Bilinear pairing is an important primitive for many 
cryptographic schemes. Here we describe some of its 
key properties.
Let (G1, +) and (G2, ×) be two cyclic groups of prime 
order p. The bilinear pairing is given as e: G1 × G1 G2,
which satisfies the followings properties:
1. Bilinearity: For all P,Q, R ∈ G1, e(P + Q, R) = e(P,
R)e(Q, R), and e(P, Q + R) = e(P, Q)e(P, R).
2. Non-degeneracy:  ∃ P, Q ∈ G1 s.t. e(P, Q)  ≠  1.
Definition 1. Given a generator P of a group G and a 3-
tuple (aP, bP, cP), the Decisional Diffie-Hellman
problem (DDH problem) is to decide if c = ab.
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Definition 2. Given a generator P of a group G and a 2-
tuple (aP, bP), the Computational Diffie-Hellman
problem (CDH problem) is to compute abP.
Definiton 3. We define G as a Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) 
group if G is a group such that DDHP can be solved in 
polynomial time but no algorithm can solve CDHP with 
non-negligible advantage within polynomial time.
2.2. Short Blind Signature with Linkability
We call the scheme SBSL=(BK,BS,BV), and BK, BS,
BV are the KeyGeneration, Signing, and Verifying 
algorithms respectively. The setup procedure is as 
follows. Let ( )qE F  be an elliptic curve and let
( )qP E F∈  be a point of prime order p ,
where , | 1p q p q≠ −/ . Let ,2 ,...,G P P P pP= = .
Then G is an abelian additive group generated by P .
Define :{0,1}*H G→ in the way as described in [2, 6].
Let sgnP be the public key of the signer. The global 
information is sgn( , , , , )BSECI G p P H P= . The signature 
scheme works as follows. 
( )BSECBK I : Pick
*
ps Z∈  randomly, compute
sgnP sP= , and return ( sgn( , , , , )pk G p P H P= , sk s= ).
( , , )BSECBS I sk m : The user picks a random
number *pr Z∈ , computes ( )M rH m G= ∈ , where
*{0,1}m ∈ , and sends M to the signer. The signer 
computes ( )X s Mσ = ⋅ and sends it to the user, where 
( )X ⋅  denotes the x-coordinate of the element. Note 
that qFσ ∈ . User then computes the
signature 1rσ σ−= ⋅ .
( , , )BV pk m σ : The verifying process is similar to 
that in [6]. Find a qy F∈  such that ( , )S yσ= is a point 
of order p  in ( )qE F . Test if
either sgn( , ) ( ( ), )e S P e H m P=  or 
1
sgn( , ) ( ( ), )e S P e H m P
−
= , where e  is a Weil Pairing, a 
bilinear map constructed over elliptic curves [2].
2.3. Analysis
We use similar techniques in [7] to prove the 
security of the short blind signature. Two main
properties, namely blindness and security against one-
more-forgery [8]. Blindness  means that the signer and 
also any other third party should not learn any
information about the messages the user obtains
signatures on. Unforgeability means that the user who
has been engaged in l runs of the protocol should not 
be able to obtain more than l signatures. 
Blindness. Since r  is chosen randomly from *pZ ,
( )M rH m=  is also a random element in the group G .
The signer receives only random information that is 
independent of the output of the user (m, σ ).
Unforgeability. This property provides the security of 
our ID-based key issuing protocol in Section 3.2. It 
means that there exists no polynomial-time adversary A
with non-negligible advantage ( )BSECIAdv A , where
( )BSECIAdv A is the probability of A to output l valid 
message-signature pairs while the number of invoked 
blind signing protocols is strictly less than l.
To prove the unforgeability  of the blind signature, 
[7] defines the chosen-target CDH assumption and
proved an equivalence relation between the
unforgeability and chosen-target CDH assumption. The
security of our scheme can be proven in a similar way. 
Theorem 1. If the chosen-target CDH assumption is 
valid in G, then SBSL is secure against one-more
forgery chosen message attack. 
Linkability. We remark that the scheme proposed is 
indeed linkable, i.e. the signature issuer can link the 
unblended signature presented by the signature
requester later with the previous invocation of the blind 
signature issuing protocol. However, we will discuss 
the linkability is not a concern if the scheme is applied 
in anonymous ID-based key issuing protocol.
3. Separable and Anonymous Key Issuing
It is unavoidable for a trusted party to authenticate 
the identity of the user in an offline manner. However,
this authentication authority may not be necessary the 
same party as the KGC for generation of private key. 
This is where the concept of local registration authority 
(LRA) comes to play. A one-time password can be 
established between the LRA and the user after the 
offline authentication. Then this password (may be in 
the form of a hash value instead of the password itself) 
together with the identity of the user is redirected to the 
KGC. With the help of this information, KGC can know 
the identity associated to the private key to be
requested when the user present this one-time
password to the KGC. This information also helps the 
KGC to check the correctness of the “blinded” identity. 
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Note that the one-time password should be stored 
securely by the user but it is not necessary to be sent 
in encrypted form if the key issuing protocol can be 
implemented as an all-or-none transaction.
We name our protocol as SAKI and let A be the user.
The setup procedure is a probabilistic polynomial
algorithm, run by KGC, that takes a security
parameter k , and returns params (system parameters) 
and the master-key. Let G be a GDH group of prime 
order p . Public information is ISAKI = (G, p, H, PKGC).
P is generator of G and *:{0,1}H G→  is a one-way
hash function and ( )A AQ H id= . We use the
MapToPoint method in [6] to construct this hash 
function. PKGC = sP is the system public keys. 
The key generation procedure is a probabilistic 
polynomial algorithm that takes as input params , the 
master-key and an arbitrary *{0,1}ID ∈ ; and returns a 
private key IDs . Here password is the user’ s chosen 
password during off-line authentication and the tuple 
(ID, password) is stored in KGC’ s database of “pending 
private key”. KGC may choose to pre-compute the 
value of e(H(ID), H(password)).
1. A: selects a random number r, AKGC: Q = 
rH(ID), T = r-1H(password).
2. KGC: checks the validity of the request by 
checking whether e(Q,T) = e(H(ID),
H(password)) holds for a certain tuple in KGC’ s 
database.
3. KGC: computes s1Q. KGCA:S = sQ.
4. A: verifies the blinded private key by checking 
e(S, P) = e(Q, PKGC). If it holds, A unblinds the 
encrypted private key and obtains sH(ID).
Then the user can delete password . The KGC can 
also remove the tuple (ID, password) from the database, 
so the database only holds the data for “private key to 
be issued”. It will not grow to the gigantic size of the 
certificate repository of traditional PKI.
3.1. Analysis
Since our scheme preserves the property that the 
public key can be determined by the identity of the user, 
it can be used with existing ID-based cryptosystems. 
Now we discuss the efficiency, confidentiality,
soundness and the blindness of SAKI. We also
provide extensions to remove the inherent key-escrow
problem of ID-based cryptosystem.
Efficiency. On users’  side, 2 scalar multiplications, 2 
modular inversions and 2 pairing computations are
needed (notice that these 2 pairing computations are 
also necessary for checking the validity of the private 
key obtained in other key issuing protocols). On KGC 
side, 1 pairing computation is needed (if pre-
computations are performed), and 1 scalar multiplication
is needed for the private key generation (again, which is 
also needed in other key issuing protocols). Note that 
the user does not need to perform pairing computations
to decrypt the encrypted private key, while it is
necessary in the previous scheme [5]. On the other 
hand, KGC does not need to have pairing computation
for encryption of the private key, but it is needed in [5]. 
In our scheme, the pairing computation is needed for 
the sake of anonymity requirement only.
Confidentiality. The SAKI scheme is directly inspired 
from the above blind signature scheme. It is obvious 
that the blinding process cannot serve as a
semantically secure encryption scheme against
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. However, in our
scenario, the things to be encrypted are the private 
keys on users’  demands. It is reasonable to assume that 
there exists no oracle helping the adversary to launch 
the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. Moreover, the 
“encryption key” r is used once only. So even in the 
case some partial information has leaked, it cannot help 
in another invocation of the protocol.
With a careful design of *:{0,1}H G→ , a user’ s 
identity information is mapped to a point
( )ID IDQ H id= on G . The order of IDQ  is the same as 
that of G , say p , a prime number large enough that 
the elliptic curve is secure. Due to ECDLP (the Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman Problem), an attacker cannot
derive w fromwQ .  So only the legitimate user who 
knows the blinding parameter can unblind the
messages and retrieve the private key.
The messages over the channel are not part of the 
private key, in contrast with BF’ s basic scheme [2], and 
its follow-on schemes, such as BF’ s threshold scheme 
[2] and Chen’ s parallel subkeys addition scheme [4].
The messages can be transmitted in plaintext and
secure channels are not needed.
Soundness. It is not possible for the user to request for 
any private key which does not correspond to his/her 
identity by the checking in Step 2 of the protocol.
Blindness. From the blindness property of the blind
signature, it is easy to see that our ID-based key 
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issuing protocol achieves the anonymity requirement. 
Now we discuss why a linkable blind signature is 
sufficient for our construction. In anonymous ID-based
key issuing protocol, we only want to keep the
blindness of the message (i.e. the identity) against any 
third party (other than the KGC and the user). The 
signature issuer (the KGC) should have the knowledge 
of the identity of the signature (private key) requester.
Linkability of the scheme does not give any advantage 
to the KGC or incur any disadvantage to the user.
3.2. Removing Key Escrow
Now we present the extension of our proposed 
SAKI to support multiple KGC so as to avoid the key-
escrow problem.
Public information becomes ISAKI = (G, p, H, PKGC1 = 
s1P, PKGC2 = s2P) where (s1, PKGC1) is the private-public
key of the first KGC (KGC1) and (s2, PKGC2) is the 
private-public key of the second KGC (KGC2). PKGC = 
s1 s2P is the system public keys. 
The key generation procedure takes params , the 
KGC private key and an arbitrary *{0,1}ID ∈ as input;
and returns a user private key IDs . Here password  is the 
user’ s chosen password during off-line authentication
and the tuple (ID, password) (possibly with pre-
computed result e(H(ID), H(password))).is stored in 
KGC1 and KGC2’ s databases. The order of interactions 
between user A and the KGCs does not really matter.
1. A: selects a random number r1, AKGC1: Q1 = 
r1H(ID), T1 = r1-1H(password).
2. KGC1: checks the validity of the request by 
checking whether e(Q1, T1) = e(H(ID),
H(password)) holds for a certain tuple in
KGC1’s database.
3. KGC1: computes s1Q and s1T. KGC1 A: S1 = 
s1Q, σ’1= s1T1,
4. A: verifies the blinded partial private key by 
checking e(S1,,P)= e(Q1, PKGC1). And verifies the 
KGC1’ s signature on the password by e(σ’1,,P)
= e(T1, PKGC1) .If both of them hold, A unblinds 
the encrypted partial private key and the
KGC1’s blinded signature on the password to 
obtain the partial private key s1H(ID) and
KGC1’s  s ignature σ1= s1H(password) .
5. A: selects a random number r2, AKGC2: σ1, Q2
= r2s1H(ID), T2 = r2-1H(password).
6. KGC2: checks the validity of the request by 
checking whether e(Q2, T2) = e(H(ID), σ1) holds 
and checks the validity of KGC1’ s signature by 
verifying e(σ1, P) = e(H(password), PKGC1)
where password is obtained from KGC2’s
database (possibly from pre-computed results).
7. KGC2: computes s2Q2. KGC2 A: S2 = s2Q2.
8. A: verifies the blinded private key by checking 
e(S2 P) = e(Q2 PKGC2). If it holds, A unblinds the
encrypted private key and obtains the final
private key S = s2 s1H(ID) .
Notice that the KGCs blindly sign on the “message” 
password  chosen by the user in the above protocol (in 
the form of the short signature [6]), so some restrictions 
(e.g. padding with “PW:”) is preferred for the password.
4. Conclusion
We proposed an anonymous ID-based key issuing 
scheme. Our scheme is separable: the authentication
and the private key generation can be computed by two 
different entities. User chosen information contributes
for the secure channels. Since the user’ s public key is 
solely dependent on the publicly available information,
the scheme can work with other existing ID-based
cryptosystems and preserving their advantages.
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